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This paper investigates the impact of the COVID-19-induced financial crisis across corporate 
debt structures. I uncover that firms with a high bond-to-total debt ratio tend to have higher 
stock returns during noncrisis periods, but face lower returns with the onset of the pandemic. I 
suggest various explanations for why this is the case, including the most likely hypothesis that 
borrowing from the market is associated with higher volatility in returns. The analysis relies 
on an original and comprehensive database built on bond offering amounts matched with 
company fundamentals and stock price data from US firms. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The COVID-19 outbreak and the measures taken to prevent its spread have brought an abrupt 
financial crisis onto the world’s economy. With social distancing coming into the picture, firms 
are hit with record output losses, giving way to widespread unemployment and bankruptcies. 
In March 2020, the US stock market saw one of the most inordinate crashes in history. In just 
over four trading days, Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) fell by 6,400 points, an equivalent 
of approximately 26%. This crisis differs from the last few financial crisis, in that the previous 
ones have been the result of multiple years, or even decades, worth of build up until systemic 
collapse was inevitable; while this pandemic was brought about in just a few months and 
entirely due to the spread of an unanticipated virus.  
Although it may be an extraordinary event, the COVID-19 pandemic affords us the singular 
opportunity to effectively analyse the impact of macroscale, unexpected economic shocks on 
firms. The premise of this study was to discern whether or not a company’s bond ratio - defined 
as debt in the form of bonds over total debt - had any influence on their resilience to the most 
recent global economic disaster we have faced. The wider implications of this research are that, 
in theory, any all-embracing phenomena that we discover are likely to pertain not only to this 
particular crisis, but rather be indicative of corporate mechanisms and behaviour at the micro 
and macroeconomic level that should apply to any economic catastrophe wherein incalculable 
risk materializes. 
In this thesis, I investigate whether stock returns are impacted differently by the pandemic 
according to firms’ choice of debt structure. Sorting firms by terciles according to their bond 
ratio, I discover that companies fostering a medium level of bond to total debt ratio have 0,37% 
higher quarterly stock returns than firms with low bond ratios, and further that companies with 




3). I attribute these findings to the primary concept that firms issuing bond debt rather than 
borrowing from banks have less expensive debt (Schwert, 2018), and therefore will have higher 
returns as a product of the lower costs. 
Breaking the stock return analysis into the pre-outbreak, which I defined as the time period 
from January 2017 to February 2020, and post-outbreak period, defined as the months 
following February 2020 until August of the same year, I was able to study corporate behaviour 
as maintained by both normalcy and shock periods. During noncrisis periods, my tests sustain 
that firms with medium and high bond to total debt ratios will on average have 1,52%  and 
3,06% higher returns than those with a low bond ratio, respectively. For these results I 
volunteer the same explanation as before.  
Moreover, I uncover that the same two terciles of corporations that see these higher returns 
appear to pay the price for them during the COVID-19 outbreak, with firms in the medium 
bond ratio tercile suffering a 8,47% fall in quarterly stock returns and those in the high tercile 
range experiencing a 5,28% decrease in returns, while firms in the low bond ratio tercile see a 
2,67% increase in returns. Accompanying this outcome, I observe that firms in the higher bond 
tercile experience the highest volatility in returns out of the three groups. Correspondingly, the 
justification follows that acquiring bond debt instead of borrowing from banks consists in a 
tradeoff between risk and return, and as such it is reasonable that, in the face of an unexpected 
global disaster, the higher risk present in the debt structure of firms with a higher bond ratio 
would materialize. The higher fall in returns experienced by the middle tercile is backed by the 
assumption that these firms would see the lowest degree of debt specialization out of the three 
groups, leading to higher bankruptcy costs due to the larger renegotiation costs associated with 





Chapter 2: Review of Relevant Literature 
2.1. The economic impact of COVID-19 
Gormsen and Koijen (2020) present one of the first comprehensive analysis on the impact of 
the pandemic on stock prices and growth expectations. Using data on dividend futures jointly 
with data on stock prices, they reveal that, as of April 3rd, in the US, the forecast of annual 
growth in dividends decreased by 27%, and the forecast of GDP growth decreased by 6.1%. 
These findings have wider consequences than simple data on falling stock prices, as, rather 
than merely capture fluctuations that might be purely transitory, they imply long-term negative 
effects on the economy. Conversely, being that we will be using data on stock prices for this 
study, we shall be investigating stock returns across bond ratios on companies only for the 
months in which we have data. However, as Gormsen and Koijen’s findings derive similarly 
from the stock market and find changes in growth expectations for the future, we may by the 
same token theorise that the variations captured in our data have long-term reverberations as 
well. 
2.2. Borrowing from Banks vs. Borrowing from the Bond Market 
Schwert (2018) has shown through direct evidence that there are some inherent differences in 
borrowing from banks as opposed to in the form of bonds. Notably, his research has found that, 
in the syndicated bank facility market, yield spreads for a particular firm will tend to be 
significantly higher than those of the bonds issued by the same firm. Schwert then justifies this 
difference through subsequent analysis on the loan premium - defined as the premium paid for 
contracting a loan rather than seeking credit through the bond market - the results of which 
imply that firms value debt coming from banks not only for the benefit of obtaining debt capital, 




offer the ability to renegotiate at a lower cost, decreasing bankruptcy costs and increasing the 
company’s room for manoeuvre. Together with the ability to draw on lines of credit, it is in 
accordance with these findings that borrowing from banks is a choice that favours firms’ 
adaptability, which should promote risk mitigation when compared with borrowing from the 
bond market. 
Considering the aspect that the loan premium itself exists, it might imply that corporations with 
a high bond ratio will, in general, have higher returns than those with low bond ratios. The 
explanation for this would be that, if we keep all other things equal, a company that pays less 
loan premium than the other will have lower costs, and consequently a higher profit margin. 
Putting together all the concepts pioneered by Schwert, we may expect corporations with high 
bond ratios to have higher returns during noncrisis periods, but lower returns during an 
unexpected shock due to their higher risk materializing. 
2.3. Debt Specialization 
Colla, Ippolito and Li (2013) have discovered evidence that debt specialization is advisable to 
firms with high expected bankruptcy costs, as it will lead to lowering these costs. They attribute 
these findings to the fact that companies that borrow from multiple creditors have higher 
renegotiation costs, which is a main contributor to them having higher expected bankruptcy 
costs. As fundament to this reasoning, we may look to Ivashina, Iverson, and Smith (2016), 
who demonstrate that corporations with few creditors will tend to have quicker debt 
restructuring after filing for chapter 11 bankruptcy, as well as have a lower probability of 
liquidation. 
This goes hand in hand with the ideas put forth by Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), who estimate 




of lenders that they borrow from, while firms with high credit rating will minimize the 
probability of defaulting on their debt by borrowing from multiple creditors. These two ideas, 
put together, give origin to the concept that the optimal debt structure is the one that minimizes 
the expected bankruptcy costs. 
We may hypothesize that firms that borrow in the form of bonds are less specialized in their 
debt than firms that borrow in the form of loans, since they are highly tradeable and do not tie 
the firm to one specific creditor, as is the case with a loan. The larger implications of this would 
be that companies that have high bond ratios will have higher costs in the event of a bankruptcy. 
Assuming this line of logic, it would follow that during the COVID-19 induced economic 
crisis, where bankruptcies are abundant, we might be able to observe a larger fall in stock 
returns for companies with a high bond ratio than those with a low bond ratio. It should be 
noted that there is a degree of conjecture in this interpretation, as Colla, Ippolito and Li’s study 
considers companies that contract mostly senior bonds or subordinated bonds to be specialized 
in senior bonds or subordinated bonds, respectively; and therefore may not consider companies 
with a high bond ratio to be unspecialized. However, as they suggest that “firms with higher 
expected bankruptcy costs should be more specialized in their borrowing to reduce 
renegotiation costs associated with multiple lenders, while firms with lower expected 
bankruptcy costs should diversify across different debt types.”, and we have seen bond debt is 
associated with higher renegotiation costs and the need to deal with multiple lenders, this 
hypothesis may hold. To add on this, the brunt of their interpretation refers to firms with a high 
degree of debt specialization as having “few” or a “single creditor”, and firms with a low degree 
of debt specialization as having “multiple creditors”, such that their expositions may easily 




The aforementioned assumptions tie into our earlier analysis of Schwert’s (2018) research, 
which would also have corporations with a high bond ratio be affected more negatively by the 
unanticipated pandemic. 
Continuing our scrutiny of Colla, Ippolito and Li’s work, a broader look at their evidence 
entails that firms with a higher proportional amount of tangible assets will have lower expected 
bankruptcy costs and seek to contract debt from as few creditors as possible. To explain the 
relationship between tangible assets and the degree of debt specialization, we may look again 
to Bolton and Scharfstein, who demonstrate that corporations with a higher concentration of 
assets that can be relocated without difficulty – that is, assets that can be sold at higher values 
to interested parties, be it other organizations in the industry or investors that can manage the 
asset – will in general have a very high degree of debt specialization. They substantiate this 
discovery with the notion that, on one hand, having only one or few creditors makes it easier 
to bargain with outside buyers, and on the other that the creditor(s) benefit more from the higher 
liquidation value if there are few of them, which has larger implications regarding the ability 
to get better rates. 
Intuitively enough, it is also exposed that cash flow volatility has a significant positive 
correlation with expected bankruptcy costs, such that a higher value of the former will by and 
large imply a higher value of the latter. This harmonizes with our later research on the 
relationship between the bond ratio and returns, where we infer that higher bond ratios are 
associated with higher volatilities in returns, which in turn may explain higher returns during 
noncrisis periods but lower returns during a crisis. 
Due to the existence of information asymmetry, creditors must collect information and monitor 
the companies they are lending to, which has associated costs. As monitoring and screening 




degree of diversification in their debt, due to not having to incentivize prospective lenders to 
monitor their activity as closely. In contrast, opaque firms will most likely have a high degree 
of debt specialization in order to account for the high level of monitoring and information 
collection costs. Colla, Ippolito and Li use research and development expenses as a measure of 
cost for these bank activities, with the justification that, as a general rule, firms with high 
investment in R&D are less predictable in the possible outcomes of their activity, and therefore 
are more difficult to appraise. Accordingly, they find that firms with high R&D expenses will 
tend to be more specialized in their debt. 
Regarding firm size, large rated firms will tend to have multiple types of debt, while small and 
unrated firms tend to borrow from few or only one source of debt. According to Colla, Ippolito 
and Li’s research, this difference is due to smaller and unrated firms not having access to some 
sections of the debt market. 
2.4. Corporate Resilience to the Pandemic 
Pagano, Wagner and Zechner (2020) conduct a study analogous to the one that I render in this 
thesis. The object of their research is to evaluate whether the level of teleworkability of a firm 
helps in mitigating the shock of the pandemic, and whether this effect is visible in asset pricing. 
The major point of interest in this study is the association of the teleworkability variable with 
the concept of firm resilience to unexpected disasters. This teleworkability measure quantifies 
the extent to which jobs in each industry classification can be enacted from home, and are thus 
less impaired by adhering to the lockdown and social distancing regulations.  
The outcomes of their tests show that, indeed, companies with higher disaster resilience 
outperformed companies with low resilience by a wide margin during the COVID-19 outbreak. 




differential of a similar nature in the returns between corporations with higher and lower 
disaster resilience. These last results can be portrayed as a manifestation of investor learning, 
that is, of an increasing appreciation of the potential economic peril that unexpected disasters 
might give way to, and of which companies will have a higher capability to withstand such 
scenarios. 
Recalling that the measure used for resilience here is teleworkability, it is likely that it does not 
account for all factors that confer flexibility and adaptability to firms in the examined setting. 
The evidence found for investors’ growing awareness of the pandemic threat may pertain only 
to the teleworkability component of the suggested resilience. I even venture to state the 
possibility that investors may have factored teleworkability into their pricing due to reasons 
other than the resilience to disasters that it confers companies, such as the ability to follow the 
global trend in our information era that every day sees more and more activities being 
performable from the comfort of one’s home. For this reason, it shall be another core objective 
of this thesis to procure evidence in favour or against investors and firms factoring into their 
loan and bond pricing the possible disaster resilience that a certain distribution of these may 
confer to corporations. 
One may anticipate that lack of liquidity and high leverage would precipitate companies’ 
vulnerability to this financial crisis, while high availability of cash and reduced leverage should 
be beneficial to firms dealing with unexpected difficulties. Ramelli and Wagner (2020) have 
demonstrated that firms belonging to the same industry saw greater declines in stock prices if 
they had reduced cash holdings or operated under high leverage. Interestingly, they also found 
that cash and leverage have a higher impact within industries that suffered more severely from 




disaster shock, so can it be speculated that high liquidity and reduced leverage confer resilience 
to corporations facing such circumstances. 
Chapter 3: Data and Methodology 
For the purposes of this study, I decided to use Stata to perform regressions of stock returns on 
bond ratios. Since there was no available dataset that had compiled all the information needed, 
the first step was to aggregate one.  
I started out by downloading from The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), through 
Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS), the data for the monthly closing stock prices (PRC) 
of all available US companies from January 2017 and onwards until December 2019, as this 
was the last available month on CRSP. Individual stocks were identified through their 
respective TICKER, PERMNO and CUSIP ID codes. Then, bringing the ticker symbol of all 
the corporations obtained in CRSP, I utilized Bloomberg to download the remaining closing 
stock prices (PX_Last) for each company from January 2020 to August of the same year. The 
data obtained here formed the basis for all dependent variables used in this research, acting as 
the instrument through which I depicted the economic impact of the pandemic across firms. 
Next, to obtain information on company fundamentals, I used the CRSP/Compustat Merged 
database, through WRDS as well, to obtain the quarterly data for long term and current debt 
(DLTTQ and DLCQ), total and current assets (ATQ and ACTQ), total and current liabilities 
(LTQ and LCTQ), cost of goods sold (COGSQ), total revenue (REVTQ), capital expenditures 
(CAPXQ), cash and cash equivalents (CHECHQ), earnings per share (EPSPXQ), dividends 
per share (DVPSPQ), research and development expenses (XRDQ), intangible assets 
(INTANQ), and the PERMNO and PERMCO of every US company for which this data was 




For the bond data, I used the Mergent fixed income securities database, through WRDS, to 
download the offering amounts for all available US corporate bonds. Then, I used the Bond 
CRSP linking tool from WRDS to match the offering amounts to their respective companies 
through their CUSIP ID codes, which also gave me the PERMCOs to which each offering 
amount pertained. In addition, the linking tool provided the link start and end dates, which 
delineated the time period in which each bond was active. Once this was done, I added up all 
the different bonds that were active between their respective link start and end dates, which 
gave me the data for total debt in the form of bonds for each available PERMCO, for every 
month from 2017 to 2019. 
Lastly, I obtained the measures recently developed in labor economics by Dingel and Neiman 
(2020) for teleworkability, gaining a variable that represented estimates of the fraction of jobs 
that can be done from home for each three-digit NAICS industry code. 
After matching the data in Stata, I proceeded to generate the variable that is the main object of 
study in this thesis – the bond to total debt ratio – by dividing the total offering amounts of 
active bonds per month by the total debt (DLTTQ + DLCQ).  
Seeking to account for the effects of cash and leverage reported by Ramelli and Wagner (2020), 
I introduced the control variables “leverage ratio” ((DLTTQ + DLCQ)/(ATQ - DLTTQ - 
DLCQ)) and “cash ratio” (CHECHQ/LCTQ). 
Following Ball, Gerakos, Linnainmaa and Nikolaev’s (2015) study on the gross profit scaled 
by the book value of total assets’ explaining power in regards to average returns, I generated 




Furthermore, retaining the discoveries of Colla, Ippolito and Li (2013) on the effects of 
research and development and tangible assets on debt specialization, I included R&D costs and 
tangible assets (ATQ - INTANQ) as control variables. 
In accordance with the chief findings of Pagano, Wagner and Zechner (2020) on firm resilience 
to the pandemic, I introduced the teleworkability variable as a control in pursuance of removing 
the components of disaster resilience that do not pertain to the focus of my study. 
Additional standard control variables include the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets 
(CAPXQ/ATQ), earnings per share, dividends per share, and size (ATQ). 
I performed multiple regressions on the data, the primary focus being to analyse the effects of 
our independent variable “bond ratio” on varying dependent variables representing firm 
returns. Due to Mergent being distinctly precise in reporting the dates of bond issuances, while 
Compustat relies on quarterly financial statements of companies, which might not be 
completely up to date, some of the values for this bond ratio variable are greater than total debt. 
As, in practice, this is an impossibility, I dealt with this by sorting bond ratio at each point in 
time across firms in terciles. For summary statistics, I capped bond ratios at 100% of the total 
debt. 
In order to study the effects of the bond ratio variable both before and during the pandemic, I 
created a dummy variable that took on the value 0 for all months up until February the 29th, 
2020, and the value 1 for March through to August of this year. Subsequently, I interacted this 
dummy for pandemic months with the dummy variables representing bond ratio terciles. 
Accordingly, the base regression for this investigation consists in regressing the quarterly stock 




the data for all dependent variables is from 2017 to 2019, the last available value for each 
variable is used for the year of 2020. All other tests presented build on this initial regression. 
Chapter 4: Empirical Results 
4.1. Hypothesis 
The crux of this thesis lies in evaluating whether or not bond ratios have mitigating capabilities 
regarding the impact of the pandemic. Therefore, the first test that I will perform will be that 
of finding out if an increase or decrease in the bond to debt ratio is associated with a fall or 
increase in returns during the COVID-19 outbreak period (Equation 1; Table 3). On account of 
this, the first hypothesis I put forth is that firms with higher bond ratios shall be worse off 
during the months pertaining to the crisis, due to the higher risk as well as higher expected 
bankruptcy costs associated with borrowing in the form of bonds. This theory is based on 
Schwert’s (2018) research, which finds a loan premium between bank debt and bond debt 
associated with the existence of bank services; and Colla, Ippolito and Li’s (2013) study, which 
sees higher expected bankruptcy costs for firms with multiple lenders. 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑞+1 = β0 + β1𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑞 + β2𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑞 + β6𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑞 + β7𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑞 +
                            β8𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑞 + β9𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑞 + β10𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑞 + β11𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑞 + β12𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋 𝑡𝑜 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑞 +
                            β13𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ & 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑞 + β14𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑞 + β15𝑇𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑞 + 𝜇  
My second hypothesis feeds into the first, and it is that firms with higher bond ratios see higher 
returns during noncrisis periods, which would explain why it is still an option for firms despite 
the higher risk associated with it, in the event that I find evidence in favour of the first 
hypothesis. This would be in accordance with Schwert’s (2018) insights on the lower costs 
associated with bond debt, since, ceteris paribus, lower costs should imply higher returns. I test 






𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑞+1 = β0 + β1𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑞 + β2𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑞 + β3𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑞 + β4𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ∗
                            𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑞 + β5𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑞 + β𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑞 + 𝜇  
I submit also that I should encounter higher returns for firms with high teleworkability, 
significantly during the pandemic months but also, in theory, during the noncrisis periods 
preceding them due to investor learning. This hypothesis, should it be found likely using the 
data I have available, would confirm the work done by Pagano, Wagner and Zechner (2020), 
and afford this analysis the means to control for teleworkability, which is of paramount 
importance given the high impact that the referred authors have found for this variable. To this 
end, I generated a dummy for firms with high teleworkability and interacted it with the 
pandemic time period and bond ratio terciles (Equation 3; Table 4). 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑞+1 = β0 + β1𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑞 + β2𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑞 + β3𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑞 + β4𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ∗
                            𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑞 + β5𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑞 + β15𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑇𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑞 +
                            β16𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑇𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑞 ∗ 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 + β17𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑇𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑞 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 +
                            β18𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑇𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑞 ∗  𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 + β19𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑇𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑞 ∗ 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 +
                            β20𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑇𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑞 ∗ 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 + β𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑞 + 𝜇  
My last central hypothesis shall be that smaller firms will take a larger hit to their returns due 
to the lack of access to some segments of the debt market prevalent in small and unrated firms 
(Colla, Ippolito and Li, 2013), which impedes them from acquiring the debt distribution that 
they desire. This hypothesis is tested through Equation 4 (Table 5), wherein the variable 
“Large” represents a dummy for firms with total assets over the median. 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑞+1 = β0 + β1𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑞 + β2𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑞 + β3𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑞 + β4𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ∗
                            𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑞 + β5𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑞 + β15𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑞 + β16𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑞 ∗ 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 +
                            β17𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑞 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 + β18𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑞 ∗  𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 + β19𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑞 ∗ 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 +
                            β20𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑞 ∗ 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 + β𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑞 + 𝜇  
4.2. Returns and Volatility Across Bond Ratios 
Confirming my hypothesis that higher bond to debt ratios are, in general, associated with higher 
returns, I find that firms with medium bond ratios have 0,37% higher returns than firms with 







relative to the former (Table 3). These statistics are higher if I do not control for teleworkability, 
with medium and high bond ratios having 0,49% and 2,33% higher returns that low bond ratios, 
respectively (Table 3). The reason I may want to do this is due to the unintuitive results  
presented in Table 4, which show disparate effects for teleworkability during the covid months, 
somewhat discrediting this variable. 
The results of the base regression (Table 2) submit that, during noncrisis periods and with all 
else being equal, firms with a medium bond ratio tend to have 1,52% higher returns than those 
with a low bond ratio, and that firms with a high bond ratio have a propensity for the highest 
returns out of the three categories, this being quantifiable at 3,06% higher returns than low 
bond ratio firms. This is in accordance with the theory behind the loan premium put forth by 
Schwert (2018). Furthermore, I observe that, on average, having a low bond ratio during the 
pandemic months has a positive impact on companies, while having a medium or high bond 
ratio lowers quarterly returns significantly. Specifically, low bond ratio companies are 
associated with a 2,67% increase in returns during the COVID-19 months, while medium and 
high bond ratios suffer an 8,47% and 5,28% fall in returns, respectively. This outcome offers 
evidence in favour of my first and second hypothesis, as I find that corporations with a high 
bond to debt ratio, despite having higher returns in noncrisis periods, see lower returns with 
the onset of an unexpected disaster as the threats associated with their higher risk take shape. 
Interestingly, I find that firms with a medium bond ratio are the most negatively affected out 
of the three by their choice in distribution of bond debt. Concerning this reaction, I present the 
explication that firms with a bond to total debt ratio lying closer to the median are neither 
specialized in bond debt nor in any form of borrowing from banking facilities. Appropriately, 
I reflect on Colla, Ippolito and Li’s (2013) work, from which it can be recalled that companies 




renegotiation costs associated with multiple lenders. Accordingly, in a time period where 
bankruptcies abound, the lower returns may be corroborated by the steeper bankruptcy costs. 
In a similar vein, while firms with higher bond ratios might be contemplated as specialized in 
bond debt, we have seen through Schwert’s (2018) research that bond debt is nevertheless 
associated with higher renegotiation costs, such that the postulation that higher bankruptcy 
costs are driving down returns may likewise pertain to this bond ratio grouping.  
Panel 1 depicts monthly returns across bond ratio terciles. In line with my previous reasoning, 
we may observe that returns for high bond ratios appear to be higher on average, as well as 
have higher volatility. The summary statistics in table 1 are also in congruence with my 
ongoing theorization, as we see higher returns for higher bond ratios, along with higher 
volatility.  
In Table 5, I present the results of a regression where I included a dummy for firms that are 
large in size and interacted it with the dummies for bond ratio terciles and COVID-19 months. 
In opposition of what I had hypothesized, I find that large firms have 4,47% lower returns 
during noncrisis periods, and experience a further 5,62% fall in returns during the crisis months. 
I speculate that this is due to a stricter adherence of larger firms to the pandemic’s regulations. 
As for the lower returns for larger firms before the pandemic, we may resort to the small firm 
effect theory, which states that small listed firms see higher returns than larger firms, on 
average. 
4.3. Factors that Stimulate or Dissuade Debt Specialization 
Table 1’s summary statistics imply that large companies are more inclined to contract debt 
from banks than in the form of bonds, while smaller firms gravitate more towards bond debt. 




by Colla, Ippolito and Li (2013), who document that small and unrated firms may not have 
access to some segments of the debt market.  
Considering research and development expenses, the statistics suggest that firms with higher 
R&D costs show a preference for high bond ratios. This culmination is in accordance with what 
one might have expected from the reviewed literature (Colla, Ippolito and Li, 2013), as firms 
with more research and development costs are less transparent and hence creditors will have 
higher screening and monitoring costs when lending to these corporations. Following 
Schwert’s (2018) study on the loan premium, it is to be expected that part of the screening and 
monitoring costs are transferred to the firm, which translates into a lower incentive to borrow 
from banks as opposed to the bond market. 
Corporate leverage ratio has an interesting distribution across the bond ratio terciles, with firms 
with high leverage favouring lower bond ratios, and firms with lower leverage preferring higher 
bond ratios. A rationale for this could be that, since bond debt is associated with higher 
volatility and expected bankruptcy costs (Colla, Ippolito and Li, 2013), firms with a high 
concentration of bond debt opt to minimize their exposure by reducing their leverage.  
Lastly, it prevails that firms with lower cash ratios gravitate towards high bond ratios. A 
suitable justification for this may be that firms low on cash have a higher difficulty in 
contracting debt from banks due to their higher probability of default. 
Regarding firm level of teleworkability and fraction of assets which are tangible, I detect no 
tendency towards a particular proportion of bond debt . 
4.4. Verifiable Corporate Resilience to the Pandemic 
The results of my regressions constitute evidence that firms with a low bond ratio are more 




medium and high bond ratios during the pandemic. Being that, according to my interpretation 
hitherto, a higher concentration of bond debt gives rise to higher returns at the price of higher 
volatility, it may by the same token be that opting for a lower bond ratio is equivalent to 
prioritizing risk and expected bankruptcy cost minimization at the price of the loan premium. 
I postulate that this relative resilience to unanticipated shocks that borrowing from banks offers 
firms is one of the ingredients that factors into the pricing of the loan premium. It is not 
unrealistic to suppose that debtors and creditors already considered the risk of pandemics and 
similar economic disasters before COVID-19. Bill Gates, along with many notable disease and 
flu experts, has been running extensive campaigns for awareness of the global threat that 
pandemics pose for years. Although it may have seemed a distant possibility, it is certain that 
there has been a growing consciousness of the perils that may arise in the event of an outbreak 
of a deadly and highly contagious disease. 
Chapter 5: Conclusion 
The contribution of this paper is manifold. Regarding the differences between corporate debt 
structures, I first uncover evidence in favour of higher bond-to-total debt ratios leading to 
higher returns during noncrisis periods. I hypothesize that this is connected to the existence of 
a loan premium and higher volatility in returns and increased risk. Secondly, I find that firms 
with medium and high bond ratio suffer more heavily in the midst of unexpected disasters, 
speculating that this is the result of the higher expected bankruptcy costs and risk materializing, 
and add that low bond ratios may contribute to companies’ resilience to unforeseeable shocks 
due to the higher flexibility syndicated by banking services. Lastly, the outcome of my research 
suggests that the resilience aspect of bank borrowing is a component which has previously 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics Across Bond Ratio Terciles 
      
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
      
Monthly Returns      
Low Bond Ratio 16,571 0.00008 0.140 -0.786 3.66 
Medium Bond Ratio 16,660 0.00434 0.131 -0.773 4.58 
High Bond Ratio 16,351 0.00678 0 .156 -0.787 4.75 
      
Quarterly Returns      
Low Bond Ratio 16,207 0.00090 0.318 -0.867 9.92 
Medium Bond Ratio 16,244 0.01449 0.305 -0.894 9.28 
High Bond Ratio 15,871 0.02819 0.394 -0.891 9.64 
      
Teleworkability      
Low Bond Ratio 17,392 0.466 0.246 0.0176 0.954 
Medium Bond Ratio 17,362 0.436 0.254 0.0176 0.954 
High Bond Ratio 17,342 0.456 0.272 0.0176 0.954 
      
Size (Total Assets)      
Low Bond Ratio 17,392 109,830 356,568 71.85 2.862e+06 
Medium Bond Ratio 17,389 34,612 80,696 59 925,199 
High Bond Ratio 17,390 23,050 54,314 20.08 742,812 
      
Tangible Assets-to-Total Assets      
Low Bond Ratio 17,389 0.830 0.218 0.0817 1 
Medium Bond Ratio 17,323 0.784 0.229 0.106 1 
High Bond Ratio 17,285 0.790 0.224 0.0999 1 
      
R&D Expenses-to-Assets      
Low Bond Ratio 6,707 0.00845 0.0170 0 0.195 
Medium Bond Ratio 9,105 0.0111 0.0176 -0.000132 0.315 
High Bond Ratio 9,306 0.0208 0.0295 -3.00e-05 0.476 
      
Leverage Ratio      
Low Bond Ratio 17,392 1.264 32.67 -1,579 487.4 
Medium Bond Ratio 17,389 0.818 34.17 -1,141 468.2 
High Bond Ratio 17,390 0.395 28.62 -1,452 414.2 
      
Cash Ratio      
Low Bond Ratio 10,326 0.0207 0.441 -3.232 5.850 
Medium Bond Ratio 13,468 -0.00624 0.549 -5.624 13.00 
High Bond Ratio 14,717 -0.0242 1.010 -36.41 20.85 
      
Profitability      
Low Bond Ratio 14,407 0.0439 0.0400 -0.197 0.572 
Medium Bond Ratio 16,886 0.0548 0.0502 -0.551 0.476 
High Bond Ratio 17,225 0.0613 0.0829 -0.724 3.297 





Table 2: Base Regression on Bond Ratio Tercile Interactions with Covid Months 
  
VARIABLES Quarterly Returns (q+1) 
  
Medium Bond Ratio 0.0152** 
 (0.00677) 
High Bond Ratio 0.0306*** 
 (0.00666) 
Covid Months 0.0267*** 
 (0.0133) 
Medium Bond Ratio * Covid Months -0.0847*** 
 (0.0172) 
High Bond Ratio * Covid Months -0.0528*** 
 (0.0172) 
Total Assets -3.84e-07*** 
 (1.29e-07) 
Earnings per Share 0.00227* 
 (0.00137) 
Dividends per Share -0.0107** 
 (0.00437) 
Leverage Ratio -1.84e-06 
 (1.83e-06) 






Research & Development 1.65e-06 
 (4.04e-06) 









Standard errors in parentheses 






Table 3: Simple regression on Bond Terciles with and without Teleworkability 
   
VARIABLES Quarterly Returns (q+1) Quarterly Returns (q+1) 
   
Medium Bond Ratio 0.00374 0.00487 
 (0.00660) (0.00658) 
High Bond Ratio 0.0211*** 0.0233*** 
 (0.00651) (0.00648) 
Total Assets -3.47e-07*** -3.36e-07** 
 (1.31e-07) (1.31e-07) 
Earnings per Share 0.00230* 0.00215 
 (0.00139) (0.00139) 
Dividends per Share -0.00994** -0.0120*** 
 (0.00444) (0.00439) 
Leverage Ratio -1.87e-06 -2.02e-06 
 (1.86e-06) (1.86e-06) 
Cash Ratio 0.0149*** 0.0153*** 
 (0.00370) (0.00370) 
Profitability -0.0866* -0.0648 
 (0.0495) (0.0490) 
CAPEX-to-Assets -0.204* -0.249** 
 (0.121) (0.120) 
Research & Development 2.05e-06 3.47e-06 
 (4.10e-06) (4.08e-06) 
Tangible Assets 2.72e-07* 2.45e-07 
 (1.59e-07) (1.59e-07) 
Teleworkability 0.0430***  
 (0.0108)  
Constant 0.0223*** 0.0371*** 
 (0.00754) (0.00651) 
   
Observations 19,246 19,298 
R-squared 0.004 0.003 
Standard errors in parentheses 









Table 4: Further Regressions on Teleworkability 
   
VARIABLES Quarterly Returns (q+1) Quarterly Returns (q+1) 
   
Medium Bond Ratio 0.0124 0.0159** 
 (0.00806) (0.00675) 
High Bond Ratio 0.0308*** 0.0310*** 
 (0.00809) (0.00664) 
Covid Months 0.0261*** 0.0270*** 
 (0.0154) (0.0149) 
Medium Bond Ratio * Covid Months -0.0697*** -0.0841*** 
 (0.0189) (0.0172) 
High Bond Ratio * Covid Months -0.0415** -0.0519*** 
 (0.0194) (0.0172) 
Total Assets -3.93e-07*** -3.93e-07*** 
 (1.29e-07) (1.29e-07) 
Earnings per Share 0.00226* 0.00226* 
 (0.00137) (0.00137) 
Dividends per Share -0.0108** -0.0109** 
 (0.00435) (0.00435) 
Leverage Ratio -1.88e-06 -1.90e-06 
 (1.83e-06) (1.83e-06) 
Cash Ratio 0.0134*** 0.0134*** 
 (0.00364) (0.00364) 
Profitability -0.0628 -0.0645 
 (0.0488) (0.0487) 
CAPEX-to-Assets -0.484*** -0.481*** 
 (0.119) (0.119) 
Research & Development 1.91e-06 1.96e-06 
 (4.04e-06) (4.04e-06) 
Tangible Assets 3.36e-07** 3.35e-07** 
 (1.57e-07) (1.57e-07) 
High Teleworkability 0.0103 0.0169*** 
 (0.0111) (0.00562) 
High Teleworkability * 0.0141  
   Medium Bond Ratio (0.0145)  
High Teleworkability * 0.00421  
   High Bond Ratio (0.0139)  
High Teleworkability * Covid Months 0.0502 -0.00702 
 (0.0337) (0.0196) 
High Teleworkability * Medium -0.0919**  
   Bond Ratio * Covid Months (0.0451)  
High Teleworkability * High Bond -0.0698  
   Ratio * Covid Months (0.0428)  
Constant 0.0143** 0.0133** 
 (0.00723) (0.00665) 
   
Observations 19,298 19,298 
R-squared 0.033 0.033 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table 5: Bond Tercile Effects Among Small and Large Firms 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES NextQuarterlyReturnss NextQuarterlyReturnss 
   
Medium Bond Ratio -0.0160 0.0119* 
 (0.0241) (0.00677) 
High Bond Ratio 0.0413* 0.0233*** 
 (0.0223) (0.00678) 
Covid Months 0.0266*** 0.0318*** 
 (0.0295) (0.0275) 
Medium Bond Ratio * Covid Months -0.0551** -0.0844*** 
 (0.0244) (0.0171) 
High Bond Ratio * Covid Months 0.0133 -0.0591*** 
 (0.0241) (0.0174) 
Total Assets -2.74e-07** -2.77e-07** 
 (1.29e-07) (1.29e-07) 
Earnings per Share 0.00367*** 0.00354** 
 (0.00138) (0.00138) 
Dividends per Share -0.00923** -0.00930** 
 (0.00434) (0.00434) 
Leverage Ratio -1.99e-06 -1.92e-06 
 (1.82e-06) (1.83e-06) 
Cash Ratio 0.0147*** 0.0143*** 
 (0.00364) (0.00364) 
Profitability 0.00474 -0.0148 
 (0.0488) (0.0485) 
CAPEX-to-Assets -0.475*** -0.453*** 
 (0.119) (0.119) 
Research & Development 3.64e-06 3.49e-06 
 (4.02e-06) (4.02e-06) 
Tangible Assets 2.16e-07 2.27e-07 
 (1.57e-07) (1.57e-07) 
Large Firm -0.0433** -0.0447*** 
 (0.0216) (0.00766) 
Large Firm * Medium Bond Ratio 0.0362  
 (0.0250)  
Large Firm * High Bond Ratio -0.0195  
 (0.0234)  
Large Firm * Covid Months 0.0419 -0.0562** 
 (0.0342) (0.0268) 
Large Firm * Medium Bond Ratio -0.0847**  
  * Covid Months (0.0339)  
Large Firm * High Bond Ratio -0.160***  
  * Covid Months (0.0346)  
Constant 0.0484** 0.0541*** 
 (0.0210) (0.00908) 
   
Observations 19,298 19,298 
R-squared 0.037 0.035 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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